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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
------0000000------
DENNIS RAY EDWARDS, A Minor, 
by and through his Guardian ad Litem, 
EDWARD EDWARDS, 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
vs. 
ANN BEARD DIDERICKSEN, 
Defendant - Respondent. 
------0000000------
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF 
------0000000------
Case No. 15780 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
appellant, Dennis Ray Edwards, a minor, by and through his guardian 
ad litem, Edward Edwards, to recover damages from defendant/ 
respondent for injuries received in an automobile accident which 
occurred on the 24th day of January, 1976. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury which found that the 
defendant was not negligent, resulting in a verdict and judgment for 
the defendant. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmation of the lower court Judgment, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 24, 1976 the plaintiff and his brother, Danny, 
left their parents residence in Honeyville, Utah to pick up Danny's 
girl friend, Devon Taylor, who lived near Thatcher in Box Elder 
County. Danny was the owner and driver of the vehicle at all times 
relevant to this case. The plaintiff and Devon were passengers. 
hrunediately prior to the accident, the driver was cautioned by both 
passengers to slow down because he was exceeding the speed limit. 
After picking up Devon, the three youths had proceeded 
north on State Route 102, and approximately one and a half miles 
south of the Thatcher Church on State Route 102, the Edwards vehicle 
was involved in a collision with another vehicle driven by the defendant, 
Ann Beard Didericksen. 
Prior to the accident there was some horse play in the 
Edwards vehicle while the group was traveling north on State Route 
102. The horse play involved the driver's right hand being pulled 
such that the vehicle swerved on to the berm and gyrated back and 
forth across the road. 
At trial, the plaintiff attempted to show that the accident 
had been caused when the defendant made a left hand turn from the 
highway into the driveway of her residence in front of the Edwards 
- 2-
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vehicle. Defendant however introduced evidence showing that eye-
witnesses had observed the Edwards vehicle traveling at an excessive 
rate of speed and apparently out of control. Michael Alan Grimsby 
testified that he observed the Edwards vehicle out of control one mile 
prior to the accident site. Peter C. Peterson testified that he saw 
the Edwards vehicle out of control a few hundred feet prior to the 
accident site. The defendant testified that she approached the place 
where she was to turn into the driveway of her home, signaling her 
intention to make a left hand turn and came to a stop on the roadway. 
She observed the Edwards vehicle approaching from the south fish-
tailing or swerving back and forth on the roadway or otherwise ~ut of 
control and decided if she stayed stopped on the roadway she would 
be struck by the Edwards vehicle. In an effort to avoid being struck 
by the oncoming car defendant proceeded to make a left turn off the 
roadway and into her driveway. The Edwards vehicle swerved into 
the borrow pit and hit the defendant's vehicle which had entered the 
defendant's driveway. 
Plaintiff's vehicle was a 1962 Thunderbird which was ten 
(10) months overdue for a safety inspection, which had a disconnected 
power steering pump, and mismatched tires consisting of a fifteen 
inch (15 ") tire on the front left wheel of the vehicle and fourteen inch 
(14") tires on the other wheels. The road where the accident occurred 
was straight and level and afforded a clear and unobstructed view for 
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both drivers of at least two hundred (200) yards. At the fune of the 
accident, the paveillent was clear and dry. 
Plaintiff presented Officer Larry Forsgren of the Utah 
Highway Patrol at the trial. Forsgren arrived at the scene shortly 
after the accident occurred and completed an accident investigation. 
At trial he gave an extensive and complete account of the observa-
tions and investigation which he made regarding the accident. The 
jury was shown the pictures that were taken of the accident site, his 
conclusions concerning the path taken by the Edwards vehicle, the 
appro:xim.ate speed of the Edwards vehicle in the moments prior to 
impact and his conclusions concerning the principal point of impact. 
On objection, what the trial Judge prohibited him from stating was his 
opinion about which of the parties were at fault in causing the accident. 
The trial Judge ruled that the jury was capable of reviewing the evidence 
and accurately determining fault. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE 
JURY WAS COMPETENT TO REACH A CORRECT 
JUDGMENT WITHOUT THE OFFICER'S OPINION 
AS TO WHICH PARTY WAS AT FAULT WAS PROPER 
AND IS CONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT BOTH IN 
UTAH AND IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
POINT I 
Prior Utah cases have held that the exclusion of an ex-
pert's opinion as to which party was at fault was proper. 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In its Brief plaintiff properly states that an expert may 
express an opinion on causation even if the opinion goes to the 
ultilnate fact and issue in question. However, plaintiff failed to 
focus upon the requirement that the opinion be in an area where a 
juror is likely to prove incapable of forming a correct judgment 
without skilled assistance. 
In Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 
P.2d 549 (1953), the court stated the following general rule: 
1 
• • • opinions as to the cause of a 
particular occurrence or accident given 
by witnesses possessing peculiar skill 
or knowledge--that is, experts--are 
admissible where the subject matter is 
not one of conunon observation or knowl-
edge, or in other words, where witnesses 
because of peculiar knowledge are competent 
to reach an intelligent conclusion and in-
experienced persons are likely to prove 
incapable of forming a correct judgment 
without skilled assistance.' Id. at 552. 
[Emphasis added.] -
The issue in Hooper was whether or not a wheel was 
defective. Having observed certain characteristics of the wheel in 
question, the expert was then asked his professional opinion as to 
whether or not these characteristics signified a defective wheel. 
This Court concluded that such a conclusion required a degree of 
sophistication of which the average juror was incapable. 
In its Brief, plaintiff has focused upon whether or not 
an expert may offer an opinion which goes to the ultilnate issue in 
-5-
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question. Admittedly Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, '4, 
allows such an opinion, but only when such an opinion is "otherwise 
admissible." The Hooper standard as affirmed in Joseph v. W. H. 
Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330 (1957) 
and Stagrneyer v. Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P. 2d 
279 (1968) requires as one of the elements that an opinion to be 
"otherwise admissible" be in a field where the average juror would 
be unable to evaluate the evidence and render a correct judgment 
without the assistance of the skilled experts opinion. 
In the instant case the jury was asked to decide whether 
the accident was caused by the defendant negligently turning in front 
of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding, or whether it was 
caused by the Edwards vehicle hurdling towards the defendant's and 
hitting the defendant's vehicle in the defendant's driveway after the 
defendant had made an emergency turn into her driveway in a fruit-
less attempt to avoid being struck by the onrushing out-of-control 
vehicle. 
In making that determination the jury had before it evi-
dence from all three occupants of the Edwards vehicle, Mrs. 
Didericksen, a neighbor who witnessed the accident, an individual 
parked along side the road who had observed the Edwards vehicle 
swerve across the road and narrowly avoid hitting him approximately 
one (1) mile prior to the accident and the testimony of Officer Forsgren. 
-6-
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As noted earlier, Officer Forsgren testified extensively concerning 
all of the observations which he made of the accident scene, the 
questions he asked of the participants following the accident, the 
photographs he took of the accident scene, the conclusions which he 
had reached concerning the location of the vehicles at impact, the 
path taken by the Edwards vehicle prior to impact, his estimation as 
to the speed of the Edwards vehicle in the moments before impact, 
etc. 
The .final question to be resolved after the presentation 
of all the evidence by both parties was this: Was the Edwards vehicle 
swerving out of control before or after the defendant began "the turn 
into her driveway? The jury needed no expert's opinion regarding 
this point: It was in a position to weigh the evidence and decide which 
version of the facts was to be believed. Accordingly, Officer Forsgren1s 
opinions concerning fault were unnecessary and properly excluded by 
the trial court. 
In Macshara v. Garfield, 20 Utah 2d 152, 434 P. 2d 756 
(1967) this court decided the identical issue raised on appeal by 
plaintiff and resolved it in favor of excluding the officer's conclusions 
concerning causation. Macshara involved an automobile accident 
where the issue presented was which party entered the intersection 
first. At trial, the trial judge refused to allow a traffic officer to in 
effect reconstruct the accident from his interpretation of the physical 
-7-
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evidence and make his conclusion as to which party entered the inter-
section first. In affirming the trial court's ruling this court stated: 
• • • We think the trial court was correct 
in not allowing the officer to in effect re-
construct the accident and the speed and 
direction of the vehicles on the basis of 
such physical evidence as: gouge marks on 
the lawn and on the curbing, the damage to 
the automobiles, and the course he assumed 
they took after the impact. The disallowance 
of the evidence was in conformity with the 
rule that such an opinion is not addrnis sible 
if a laynian of ordinary intelligence can just 
as well interpret the evidence as the ex-
perts. In this connection it should be 
observed that all of the complete evidence, 
including photographs taken of the vehicles, 
were before the jury. Andfurther, that the 
trial court did allow the officer to give his 
observations as to the damage to the 
vehicles and its causation, and to give his 
estimate of their speed based upon the skid 
marks. Id. at 757. [Emphasis added.] 
Macshara is directly in point with the instant case. In 
Macshara the question was which party entered the intersection first; 
in the instant case the issue is did the defendant initiate her turn 
before or after the Edwards vehicle began swerving across the road-
way. As in Macshara, the officer in the instant case was permitted 
to give his observations concerning the path taken by the Edwards 
vehicle, the speed of the Edwards vehicle, and the probable point 
of impact. Plaintiff has raised no issues which distinguished the in-
stant case from Macshara. Accordingly, in the instant case the trial 
court's judgment should be affirmed. 
-8-
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This Court has acknowledged that the trial court is to be 
given wide discretion in its rulings upon the admissibility of expert's 
opinions. Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 449 P. 2d 996 (1969) in-
volved a suit by a passenger against the driver of the vehicle in which 
the plaintiff was riding and against the driver of another automobile 
who collided with the first vehicle. At trial, the judge admitted and 
excluded portions of the testimony of two experienced police officers 
who were involved in the investigation of the accident. On appeal 
defendant Irvine argued that the trial court had been incorrect in its 
decisions as to which portions of the testimony should be accepted 
and which excluded. This court stated: 
• Without belaboring the detail 
thereof we make the following general 
observations which are controlling here. 
When it appears that the determination 
of an issue will be aided by knowledge of 
something which is not generally known 
by laymen, it is in order to permit one 
who has specialized knowledge on the sub-
ject, and thus may properly be called an 
expert, to testify concerning his knowledge 
and/or his opinion to provide better under-
standing of the situation. Because of his 
position as the authority in charge of the 
trial, the trial judge should be allowed a 
reasonable latitude of discretion both as 
to the necessity for such expert testimony 
and as to the qualification of the witness 
to give it. We are not persuaded that he 
transgressed the bounds of reason or 
abused his discretion here. Id. at 999. 
[Emphasis added.] -
In the instant case plaintiff has cited no cases which hold 
-9-
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that the exclusion of an officer's opinion concerning causation on 
facts siznilar to those of the instant case consitituted an abuse of 
discretion. Rather, plaintiff asserts without authority that the aver-
age juror would be incapable of analyzing the causation question on 
the basis of the evidence presented by the police officer and other 
witnesses. This assertion is contrary to the decisions reached by 
this court in Macshara and Marsh. Consistent with those cases this 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
POINT II 
The trial court's exclusion of the officer's opinion on 
causation is consistent with decisions in other jurisdictions. 
Lollis v. Superior Sales Co., Inc., 580 P. Zd 423 (Kan., 
1978) involved a suit by a motorcyclist for injuries he sustained 
when his motorcycle, which had been following a beer truck, collided 
with the right rear side of the truck as it was making a right turn. 
Under Kansas Rules of Evidence opinion testimony of 
experts on ultimate issues is admissible when the opinion will aid 
the jury in the interpretation of technical facts or when it will assist 
the jury in understanding material in issue. The Kansas court stated: 
• • • We have no quarrel with the rule 
recognized in Spraker v. Lankin, supra, 
that experienced police officers and re-
construction experts, having the requisite 
experience and training, should be per-
mitted to express opinions as to the speed 
of vehicles involved in highway collisions 
-10-
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when based upon the evidence observed 
at the scene of the accident, including 
direction of travel, skid marks, point of 
iinpact, damages to the vehicles, and the 
location in which the vehicles came to 
rest. We have concluded, however, that 
a highway patrolman or other expert may 
not properly state either his opinion as to 
which of the parties was at fault in causing 
an accident or his opinion concerning what 
actions of the parties contributed to the 
accident. .!!!:__at 431. [Emphasis added. J 
The instant case raised the identical issue resolved by 
the Kansas Court. In the instant case the investigating officer was 
permitted to testify as to all of his findings but was not permitted 
to testify as to his conclusion concerning the causation of the acci-
dent. 
In both the instant case and Lollis the situation was one 
where the normal experience and qualifications of layTnan jurors 
would have enabled them to draw proper conclusions without the aid 
of expert conclusions or opinions and accordingly expert's opinion 
on causation were properly excluded. 
Bailey v. Rhodes, 276 P. Zd 713 (Ore., 1954) involved a 
suit by a guest for injuries sustained in an automobile accident against 
the driver of the automobile alleging negligence on the grounds of 
successive speed and intoxication. The trial court allowed an investi-
gating officer to testify to his conclusions concerning the defendant's 
rate of speed at the tiine of the accident. The Oregon Supreme Court 
-11-
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reversed stating that: 
• A jury is as well able to draw its 
own inferences and reach its own con-
clusions from the facts presented . • • 
Id. at 719. 
In Kelso v. Independent Tank Co., 348 P. 2d 855 (Okla., 
1960) the Oklahoma Court stated that: 
• • • Where the cause of a motor vehicle 
collision is within the knowledge and un-
derstanding of ordinary persons, it is an 
ultimate issue for the jury, and it is prej-
udicial error to admit expert opinion 
testimony on such issue, over objection of 
opposing party. Id. at 856. 
Although some courts have excluded evidence on the basis 
that it goes to the "ultimate issue" in the case, the underlying basis 
of the exclusion is that the opinion evidence being offered is not 
necessary for a jury to properly decide the case. In Kelso, despite 
the use of the term "ultimate issue" by the court, the court made 
clear, as is reflected in the above quoted citation, that the opinion 
evidence was being excluded because it was within the knowledge and 
understanding of ordinary persons and consequently was not required 
by the jury. 
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized and adopted the 
above discussed principle. In Meyst v. East Fifth Avenue Service, 
Inc., 401 P. Zd 430 (Alas., 1965) the court affirmed the trial court's 
exclusion of an expert's opinion on causation of the automobile acciden~ 
-12-
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The court ruled that the expert's opinion was properly excluded not 
because it went to the ultimate issue or invaded the province of the 
jury, but because the jury could make its own independent determina-
tion as to the cause of the accident on the basis of the other evidence 
introduced at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the above discussed cases reached the identical 
decision that was reached by the trial court in the instant case. All 
of the cases involved automobile accidents and a determination as to 
which party caused the accident. In all of the cases the Appellate 
Court concluded that an expert's opinion as to causation of the auto-
mobile accident should be excluded because the jury was in a position 
to determine causation on the basis of the evidence available to it. 
In Macshara this court specifically adopted the position 
taken by defendant in the instant case and ruled that the exclusion of 
the expert's opinion as to causation was proper. The position of 
Macshara is consistent with case law in other jurisdictions. Plaintiff 
has cited no cases in which a contrary concludion was reached. The 
Hooper case cited by plaintiff is distinguishable from the instant case 
because Hooper required a decision as to whether or not a wheel was 
defective. Determination of the defective condition of a product is 
substantially different from determining which of two parties' actions 
were responsible for causing the accident. The thrust of plaintiff's 
-13-
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argument is that the officer's opinion on causation was excluded because 
it was an ultiniate issue. Plaintiff argues further that "ulfunate issue" 
evidence is admissible and hence that the trial court corruni:~ed error 
in excluding the opinion evidence. However, as this Court has pointed 
out in Joseph, supra, the funda.m.ental issue is not whether the opinion ' 
evidence goes to the ultiniate issue before the jury, but whether or 
not the opinion evidence is otherwise admissible, i.e., is the subject 
of inquiry beyond the field of knowledge generally possessed by laymen. 
Id. at 334. 
Plaintiff fails to pass this test. The trial court properly 
ruled that the jury was in a position to reach a knowledgeable conclusion 
as to the individuals responsible for the accident in the instant case. 
The jury had before it the testiniony of the participants, eyewitnesses, 
and Officer Forsgren concerning the facts he found upon his investiga-
tion and his conclusions concerning the path of the Edwards vehicle and 
the principal point of impact. His opinion concerning causation was 
not necessary for the jury to reach an accurate decision. 
-14-
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For these reasons defendant respectfully requests that 
the judgment of the court below be affirmed. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
600 Commercial Club Building 
3 2 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-3773 
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